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While much effort has been invested in studies of traffic flow as a physics problem, two emerging
trends in technology have broadened the subject for new investigations. The first trend is the
development of self-driving vehicles. This highly-anticipated shift from human- to autonomous-
drivers is expected to offer substantial benefits for traffic throughput by streamlining large-scale
collective behavior. The second trend is the widespread hacking of Internet-connected devices,
which as of 2015, includes vehicles. While the first proof-of-concept automobile hack was done
at the single-vehicle scale, undesirable collective effects can easily arise if this activity becomes
more common. Motivated by these two trends, we explore the phenomena that arise in an active
matter model with lanes and lane-changing behavior. Our model incorporates a simplified minimal
description of essential differences between human- and autonomous-drivers. We study the emergent
collective behavior as the population of vehicles shifts from all-human to all-autonomous. Within
the context of our model, we explore a worst-case scenario where Internet-connected autonomous
vehicles are disabled simultaneously and en masse. Our approach reveals a model-independent role
for percolation in interpreting the results. A broad lesson our work highlights is that seemingly
minor malicious activity can ultimately have major impacts when magnified through the action of
collective behavior.
Autonomous vehicles are highly sought for their poten-
tial to revolutionize transportation. This convergence be-
tween automotive and IT industries is expected to ripple
beyond the immediate in-vehicle experience, and yield a
broader array of benefits for society with changes in both
commercial and private sectors[1] [see SM]. However,
this focus on the value of technology-driven disruption
leaves potential blind spots with respect to emergent risks
brought by automotive computerization. For example,
proof-of-concept hacks in 2015 and 2016 demonstrated
the ability to remotely control an Internet-connected ve-
hicle, including the brakes, acceleration, and steering
[2, 3]. Given that the level of computerization will only
increase with self-driving vehicles, there is a deep need
to understand the consequences of hackers leveraging re-
mote automation to achieve undesirable ends. We there-
fore consider a worst-case scenario where various num-
bers of connected vehicles are simultaneously and en
masse disabled during transit. While the details of how
such a hack would be executed are beyond the scope of
our work here, similar concerns have been raised by cy-
bersecurity experts[4, 5]. To explore this critical blind
spot, we model human and autonomously driven vehi-
cles as an active matter system[6, 7]. Unlike conventional
flowing systems subject to the kinetic phenomenon of
clogging[8, 9], the incorporation of lanes and lane chang-
ing behavior motivates the geometric phenomenon of per-
colation as the relevant framework for understanding col-
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lective behavior that emerges in the presence of disabled
vehicles.
We begin this study by defining a microscopic model
for human and autonomously driven vehicles. Of the
different approaches to modeling vehicular collective
motion[10–17], we chose a force-based approach[18–20]
that represents each vehicle by their position x at time
t on a straight road of length L. The main appeal of
this type of model is the rich complexity of interesting
collective behavior that can be generated by its simple
set of equations and correspondingly small set of param-
eters. Numerical simulations were performed using ve-
locity Verlet integration for N vehicles seeded with uni-
formly distributed random initial positions, zero initial
velocity, zero initial acceleration, and periodic bound-
ary conditions. The position of each vehicle was evolved
using a self-propulsion force F propulsion, and a repulsive
collision-avoidance force F repulsion according to
x¨ = F propulsion + F repulsion,
F propulsion = τ−1α (vα − x˙),
F repulsion =
{
α (1− δx/R)3/2 , δx < R
0, otherwise
(1)
where x˙ and x¨ are the velocity and acceleration of a given
vehicle [see SM]. Each vehicle has a preferred speed vα
and a characteristic response time τα that it takes to
equilibrate to this speed. In the limit of a single vehicle
without interactions, F repulsion ≡ 0 and direct integration
shows x˙(t) = vα(1 − e−t/τα). As the number of vehicles
increases and they begin to interact, the repulsive force
slows a given vehicle down as it approaches another ve-
hicle from behind. The strength of this force increases
smoothly from zero as the vehicle-vehicle separation δx
becomes smaller than the interaction threshold distance
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2R = (29 m/s) · (2 s). This threshold models the 2-second
rule on highway-like conditions, which states a minimum
safe distance between two vehicles is the distance traveled
during 2 seconds at typical speeds of 29 m/s (65 mi/h).
The functional form of the repulsion force in Eqs. (1) fol-
lows from the compression of two elastic spheres[21], and
only applies to the trailing vehicle, as drivers respond
to traffic ahead of them more strongly than behind. Un-
der these conditions, we balance propulsion and repulsion
forces when two vehicles are bumper-to-bumper, and set
δx = r ≡ 4.5 m as the typical size of a vehicle to find
α ≡ [(29 m/s)/τα](1− r/R)−3/2. Thus, the distance be-
tween vehicles δx is always larger than the size of a vehi-
cle r, but the interaction between vehicles is only expe-
rienced when r ≤ δx < R.
For simplicity, we focus on the emergent collective mo-
tion of two types of vehicles: human-driven and fully
autonomous. In Eqs. (1), this simplification amounts to
distinct values for the variables with subscript α, where
we use α = H for human-driven vehicles and α = A
for autonomous vehicles. For example, NH denotes the
number of human drivers and NA denotes the number
of autonomous drivers. Each of the NH human drivers
is given a randomly chosen preferred velocity vH cho-
sen from a Gaussian distribution with mean 29 m/s and
standard deviation 6.7 m/s (15 mi/h). For the NA au-
tonomous drivers, we fix their preferred velocity vA = 29
m/s to be constant and equal to the typical speed limit.
This homogeneity reflects the notion that autonomous
vehicles will be engineered to travel at the legally allowed
maximum speed to optimize traffic flow and safety.
The only remaining free parameter in the equations of
motion for human-driven vehicles is the response time
τH , which generally varies from 0.5 s to several seconds,
depending on attentiveness, driving conditions, visibil-
ity, and level of distractions. To empirically measure
τH , we analyzed three sources of driving data includ-
ing a highway webcam [Fig. 1(a)][22], digital footage we
recorded [Fig. 1(b)], and previously published Depart-
ment of Transportation (DOT) traffic data from Los An-
geles, California (southbound US 101; NGSIM June 15,
2005, 7:50 to 8:05 am)[23–25]. By measuring the veloc-
ity in “stop-and-go” traffic and assuming the repulsion
force is negligible during the initial “go,” we could fit
this data to x˙(t)/x˙(tf ) = 1 − e−t/τH resulting in mea-
surements of τH [Fig. 1(c)]. In higher-density traffic, we
observed drivers tend to accelerate over longer periods
of time, whereas in lower-density traffic, drivers tend to
react faster. Because Eqs. (1) simplifies driver response
time to be density-independent, we set τH = 2.0 s, which
comes from the average of empirical measurements that
were found to be (2.0± 1.4) s.
In simulations with NH = 100 human-driven vehicles
on an ` = 1 lane road, L = 1.0 km long, we find a
brief transient regime that lasts for ≈ 500 integration
time steps, followed by steady-state dynamics. Superim-
posed on this 1D line of traffic, we observe backwards-
propagating density waves known as “phantom traffic
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FIG. 1. Empirical measurements of a human-driven vehi-
cle’s response time τH . (a) A live streamed web cam pro-
vides daytime video data on traffic flow (northbound 101 at
N 1st street, San Francisco/Oakland Bay, CA). Individual ve-
hicles (squares) and their trajectories (lines) illustrate mea-
surements of x(t). (b) Nighttime highway traffic was filmed
and analyzed using the same methods (southbound I85 exit
249C, Atlanta, GA). (c) Fitting velocities during stop-and-go
motion allows for measurements of the human-driver response
time τH . Box-and-whisker plots show the median value, data
quartiles, and outliers (+).
jams” that cause stop-and-go motion of individual ve-
hicles [Fig. 2a]. This emergent collective phenomenon
has been extensively studied in other models of vehicle
traffic[10–16], and is generally known to arise from the
non-zero driver response time τH . Here, we see these
density waves as an important validation of our active
matter model, as their spontaneous emergence indicates
broad consistency with the known phenomenology of ve-
hicle traffic.
Going beyond one-lane simulations and reproducing
essential features of multi-lane traffic where ` > 1 re-
quires a model for lane changing behavior. Otherwise,
quantitative metrics of traffic flow would be dominated
by the slowest moving vehicle. One method for re-
alistically capturing these dynamics is the Minimizing
Overall Breaking Induced By Lane changes (MOBIL)
framework[26, 27], which offers a simple force-based rule
to determine when a vehicle should change lanes. Specif-
ically, MOBIL considers whether a vehicle and its neigh-
bors would better match their preferred speeds if a given
vehicle changes lanes [see SM]. In our implementation,
this algorithm effectively minimizes F repulsion over all ve-
hicles involved, and enables quantitative predictions of
traffic flow beyond the qualitative observations of phan-
tom traffic jams [Fig. 2(a)]. For example, we use the
density-dependent flux Φ(ρ) as a measure to study the
emergent collective properties of multi-lane traffic flow
[Fig. 2(b)]. In empirical measurements and simulations
with ` = 3 lanes, we use a portion of the road l ≈ 500 m
to calculate Φ =
∑
i x˙i/(`l) and ρ =
∑
i 1/(`l), where
3the index i runs over all vehicles in l, sampled at statisti-
cally independent temporal intervals. Comparing obser-
vational data [Fig. 2(b), green dots] to simulation pre-
dictions with MOBIL lane changing [Fig. 2(b), black line
and blue-shaded band] shows a broad consistency with
no fitting parameters. Both in empirical measurements
and simulations, we find that when the density is low,
Φ ∝ ρ [Fig. 2(b), ρ < 30 cars/km/lane]. As the density
increases to a critical value ρ∗ ≈ 30 cars/km/lane, the
flux peaks, and subsequently declines for increasing ρ. In
simulations, we find ρ∗ corresponds to an average of one
vehicle per 33 m of road per lane. This distance is ≈ 1.1 s
of travel time between vehicles, placing them within the
repulsive-force interaction distance R. As such, when
ρ > ρ∗, the system is effectively a 1D continuum with
density waves [Fig. 2(a), horizontal bands] that produce
the decline of Φ at larger ρ.
Thus far, our simulations and analysis have focused on
human-driven vehicles. Incorporating autonomous vehi-
cles requires that we fix the final parameter τA, which is
the autonomous driver response time. Given these highly
computerized vehicles are expected to utilize a combina-
tion of local sensor information, wirelessly shared non-
local traffic conditions, and cloud-connected AI, we can
reasonably assume they will respond to driving condi-
tions more rapidly than human drivers. As an order of
magnitude estimate, we set the autonomous vehicle re-
sponse time τA = 0.1 s, which is a fraction of the human
response time τH , but still larger than the simulation
time step. Simulations with all autonomous vehicles im-
mediately show important differences in the flux Φ(ρ),
highlighting a key advantage of autonomous vehicles over
human drivers that underlies their anticipated impact
on automotive transport. Specifically, Φ(ρ) still peaks
near the same critical density ρ∗, however, with all au-
tonomous vehicles Φ(ρ∗) is nearly 20% larger [Fig. 3(a),
upper light-bronze data]. Even with a 50/50 mix of au-
tonomous and human vehicles there are substantial ad-
vantages at the highest densities where the flow is stead-
ier relative to results with all human drivers [Fig. 3(a),
upper light-red data, ρ > ρ∗ cars/km/lane]. The combi-
nation of higher throughput and steadier flow translate to
reduced congestion, reduced fuel consumption, and less
time spent traveling between destinations.
Interestingly, Φ(ρ) in all-autonomous vehicle simula-
tions can be predicted from Eqs. (1). Given the uni-
form preferred speed and rapid response time, Φ ≈
NAx˙/(`L) = ρx˙. Under steady conditions, propulsion
and repulsion forces balance so that x¨ = 0 and δx = 1/ρ,
which leads to x˙ = vA − τA[1 − 1/(2ρvA)]3/2. The flux
is therefore the real part of Φ(ρ) = ρvA − ρτA[1 −
1/(2ρvA)]
3/2 = ρvA
[
1−
(
1−1/(2ρvA)
1−r/R
)3/2]
, where we
have used the expression for A derived from force bal-
ance to find the final equation. Comparing this predic-
tion to simulations shows strong agreement [Fig. 3(a),
solid black line].
From the perspective of the flux-density relationship,
avg.
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FIG. 2. Simulations of human-driven vehicles using Eq. (1)
reproduce empirical data. (a) Trajectory plots of NH = 100
simulated human drivers on a L = 1 km, ` = 1 lane road.
Each colored line corresponds to a vehicle that generally in-
creases its position x over time. Horizontal line segments in-
dicate stand-still conditions with no forward motion. Bands
of horizontal line segments that move diagonally-down on the
plot are phantom traffic jams, which manifest as backwards-
propagating density waves. (b) Flux-density relationship for
human-driven vehicles on a L = 1 km, ` = 3 lane road
shows favorable agreement between empirical and simulation
results. Error bars on live stream data are the inter-quartile
range. DOT measurements are plotted as a continuous se-
ries of points with density ρ greater than the critical density
ρ∗ ≈ 30 cars/km/lane. Solid line is the simulated mean value
of Φ(ρ) and the shaded band shows statistical fluctuations.
there are measurable benefits to having an increased
number of autonomous vehicles on the road due to
the generally increased throughput of traffic. However,
as indicated by recent proof-of-concept hacks, Internet-
connected vehicles are endowed with enhanced abilities
at the cost of new risks. The worst-case scenario we con-
sider is one in which hacked vehicles are disabled during
transit, which in the context of our model, amounts to
setting vA = 0 after the simulation has reached steady-
state. This type of event has actually been proposed as
an active self-defense mechanism for vehicles that detect
their systems have been compromised, though it was of-
fered in the context where only a single vehicle was being
considered[4]. If we assume this strategy was broadly de-
ployed, a wide-spread hack that compromises many ve-
hicles simultaneously would most certainly give rise to
40   2000Flux
Φ
pre-hack
post-hack
(a)
(b) pre-hack (c) post-hack
FIG. 3. While increasing the number of autonomously-driven
vehicles generally increases the total flux Φ, a malicious hack
disabling autonomous vehicles sends Φ to near-zero values,
especially in high-density traffic. (a) Flux-density relation-
ship shows how increasing the number of autonomous drivers
from 50% (upper light-red data) to 100% (upper light-bronze
data) offers greater vehicle throughput. A hack that disables
autonomous vehicles reduces the flux to zero or near-zero val-
ues (lower dark-red data). Solid black line is a theoretical
prediction for autonomous drivers based on force-balance in
Eq. 1. (b) Heat map for the flux Φ generally shows increased
throughput of vehicles as autonomous drivers replace human
drivers. (c) Disabled autonomous vehicles create bottlenecks
on the road leading to unsteady and near-zero flow. Gray
lines represent contours of constant density of disabled au-
tonomous vehicles ρA = 5, 10, 15, 20, and 25.
new collective behavior that affects any functional vehi-
cles still on the road. For example, a 50/50 mixture of
human and autonomous drivers in this circumstance has
a substantial loss of flow with a nearly 60% reduction in
the peak flux and a total loss of flow at higher densities
[Fig. 3(a), lower dark-red data ρ > 20 cars/km/lane].
Generating heat maps for Φ(ρ) with varying fractions
of autonomously driven vehicles NA/(NA +NH) offers a
more complete view of the benefits of autonomous ve-
hicles [Fig. 3(b)] as well as the effects on flow when
these vehicles are disabled [Fig. 3(c)]. Comparing the
pre-hack to the post-hack results show the flow largely
collapses when vehicles are disabled, leaving behind un-
steady and near-zero flux, even at relatively low fractions
of autonomous vehicles [Fig. 3(b) and (c), increased size
of red region]. In the post-hack scenario we observe the
flux substantially drops when the fraction of disabled au-
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FIG. 4. Percolation of obstacles is a generic mechanism for
loss of flux. (a) Probability of no-flow conditions (Φ = 0)
at a given density of disabled autonomous vehicles. Simu-
lation data for combinations of human-driven and hacked-
autonomous vehicles (H-A, solid red squares) are consistent
with a geometric obstacle percolation prediction (H-A, solid
red line). Similarly, simulation data for uncompromised and
hacked-autonomous vehicles (A-A, solid blue circles) are con-
sistent with the same geometric percolation prediction (A-A,
solid blue line). These findings are reproduced by the Nagel-
Schrekenberg cellular automata model with a population of
disabled vehicles (red and blue open symbols), and likewise
agree with the predictions of geometric obstacle percolation
(red and blue dashed lines). Left inset shows the velocity
of each human-driven vehicle in H-A simulations versus the
mean-field predicted velocity. The data separates onto two
lines indicating two discrete outcomes with Φ > 0 (black di-
agonal line, slope = 1), and Φ = 0 (black horizontal line,
slope = 0). Right inset shows the same plot for simulations of
all-autonomous vehicles, where only a fraction have been dis-
abled. Here again, we find the same set of discrete outcomes.
Cartoon illustrations of model showing (b) how lane switch-
ing around non-percolated obstacles allows for flux Φ > 0,
and (c) how percolated obstacles lead to a complete loss of
vehicle flow (Φ = 0).
tonomous vehicles exceeds 10 to 20% [Fig. 3(c), boundary
of lower green band]. At the same time, this number of
self-driving vehicles corresponds to a rather small ben-
efit in the pre-hack scenario relative to bounds at the
NA/(NA + NH) = 0 and 1 limits [Fig. 3(b)]. Evidently,
the risks introduced by connected-car technologies have
an earlier onset than the benefits, as measured by vehicle
throughput.
5To better understand the emergent collective behav-
ior of the scenario being considered, we note the result-
ing flux contours of the post-hack heat map appear to
follow lines of constant autonomous vehicle density ρA
[Fig. 3(c), solid and dashed lines]. This observation sug-
gests ρA is a quantity of significant explanatory power
for how disabled vehicles affect traffic flow. We therefore
use the data that generated the heat map to calculate
the probability that Φ = 0 as a function of ρA, revealing
a well-defined sigmoidal-like relationship [Fig. 4(a), solid
red squares]. Furthermore, when we plot the actual ve-
locity of vehicles x˙i against the mean-field velocity Φ/ρ,
we see the data separates onto two distinct curves: the
x˙i = Φ/ρ curve where simulation and prediction agree
up-to fluctuations [Fig. 4(a) left inset, red data along
black diagonal line, 11% of simulation data], and the
x˙i = 0 no-flow curve [Fig. 4(a) left inset, red data along
black horizontal line, 89% of the simulation data]. Taken
together, the combination of the bimodal separation of
velocities and the smooth sigmoidal relationship between
flow and no-flow outcomes strongly suggests the presence
of a percolation phase transition.
A simple description of percolation is the study of flow
through porous materials[28–31]. When the material’s
pores are connected such that a continuous path exists
between two surfaces, fluid is able to move through the
material. Conversely, when no continuous path between
surfaces can be found, fluid cannot flow. Complex phe-
nomenology is then introduced through the non-trivial
network of connections among the material’s pores. Of-
ten, random lattice models are used to recapitulate the
statistical properties of pore connectivity, and the promi-
nent features studied are the emergence of a flow to no-
flow phase transition where universality and scaling phe-
nomena are readily found.
In our model, there appears to be a percolation phase
transition where the flow of traffic is analogous to the flow
of fluid, the `-lane road is the material, and disabled ve-
hicles create a network of obstacles reminiscent of a series
of connected pores. Freely-moving vehicles approaching
a disabled vehicle from behind continue to flow, as would
a conventional fluid, although the underlying mechanism
relies on lane switching behavior [Fig. 4(b)]. When dis-
abled vehicles align across all ` lanes, they form an immo-
bile barrier obstructing flow [Fig. 4(c)]. In this sense, the
percolation of obstacles appears to be the critical fac-
tor determining traffic flow properties, especially when
asking whether a given simulation produces either a flow
or no-flow condition [Fig. 4(a), left inset, diagonal and
horizontal branches]. Obstacle percolation should be dif-
ferentiated from the formation of clogs[16, 32], which are
dynamic in nature, depend on observation time, and have
statistical properties distinct from percolation that do
not match our results. Nevertheless, if percolation is the
correct framework, then stochastically placing obstacles
at density ρA on an `-laned road and computing the prob-
ability that these obstacles percolate should reproduce
the measured probability distribution for Φ = 0. In this
calculation, we set the length for steric interactions of
disabled autonomous vehicles and moving human-driven
vehicles equal to the balance of repulsion and propulsion
forces, described by Eqs. (1). On average, these values
are 8.5 m (> r) for human-driven vehicles and 4.5 m (= r)
for autonomous vehicles, where the larger-than-expected
average value for human-driven vehicles arises from het-
erogeneity in the preferred velocity vH and the non-linear
repulsion force. Remarkably, this minimal calculation,
which only depends on the geometry of percolation, is
able to accurately reproduce the probability distribution
for Φ = 0 [Fig. 4(a), solid red line].
In light of the different effective sizes for human and
autonomous vehicles, we can use geometric obstacle per-
colation to predict the probability that Φ = 0 when the
road contains all autonomous vehicles, but only a frac-
tion are disabled [Fig. 4(a), solid blue line]. Comparing
this new scenario to a direct microscopic simulation again
shows a bimodal separation of flow and no-flow outcomes
[Fig. 4(a), two branches of right inset]. Moreover, the
probability distribution for Φ = 0 computed separately
by microscopic simulation and geometric obstacle perco-
lation accurately agree with one another [Fig. 4(a) solid
blue circle match solid blue line]. We can further show
the emergence of percolation is a model-independent re-
sult when explaining the effects of disabled vehicles. We
implemented the Nagel-Schrekenberg cellular automata
model of traffic flow on an `-lane road with steric in-
teraction of 4.5 and 7 m, disabled a number vehicles at
density ρA by setting their speed to 0, and computed the
probability that Φ = 0. Even in this completely different
model for traffic flow, the microscopic numerical simula-
tions [Fig. 4(a), open red squares and circles] continue to
match the prediction of obstacle percolation [Fig. 4(a),
dashed red and blue lines]. Thus, as as suggested by
the contours of constant ρA in the post-hack heat map
for Φ [Fig. 3(c)], the density of autonomous vehicles ρA
explains the emergent flow phenomenology.
We motivated this work by exploring the unintentional
collective effects that can arise when Internet-connected
autonomous vehicles are disabled suddenly and en masse.
Our approach utilized a lane-based active matter model
and uncovered a model-independent role for percolation
in interpreting the results. Looking more broadly at the
immediate consequences of obstacle percolation, we see
a striking set of potential outcomes: emergency vehi-
cles would be unable to respond to calls for help, food
shipments to grocery stores would be delayed, and long-
distance commuters would be unable to get to work. Ur-
ban cores and suburban towns, which are key centers
of economic activity, would cease to function normally.
Given the magnitude of these potential harms, there is a
clear need to proactively develop strategies that mitigate
the risks posed by obstacle percolation.
Fortunately, our results on the statistics of obstacle
percolation indirectly suggest a way to achieve this risk-
mitigation. The probability of no-flow is small when
the densities of disabled vehicles are correspondingly low
6[Fig. 4(a)], so the goal should be to minimize the num-
ber of affected vehicles, as one would naturally guess.
The probability of geometric percolation allows us to as-
sess how different strategies result in different effective
risk levels. One approach could be to distribute ve-
hicle communications across multiple independent net-
works in such a fashion that a hack affecting one net-
work would have no effect on the others. These multiple
non-overlapping networks would appear inefficient from
the perspective of communication standards, but it of-
fers a greater degree of robustness with respect to the
cyber-physical issues motivating this study. While such
strategies are yet to be developed and deployed, only
by anticipating these worst-case scenarios can we inocu-
late for their consequences. For example, if there were 10
separate networks, each connected to 1/10 of all vehicles,
then a network-wide hack would have the effect of dis-
abling only 10% of the vehicles on the road. In light of our
simulation results [Fig. 3(c), NA/(NA +NH) = 0.1], this
relatively modest number of disabled vehicles would still
allow traffic to generally flow. To achieve higher impact,
a hacker would have to breach multiple separate net-
works, each with their own security and communications
protocols, increasing the level of difficulty and sophisti-
cation required to realize a worst-case scenario. While
these particular simulations were computed with specific
ratios of human and autonomous drivers, the physics of
percolation [Fig. 4(a)] ensures similar outcomes. Indeed,
this generality is the strength of the obstacle percolation
interpretation uncovered here.
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SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS
FORESEEABLE RIPPLE EFFECTS OF
AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
With any major technological innovation, there are
foreseen and unforeseen consequences that ripple through
society. To date, considerable effort has gone into study-
ing how the U.S. public and private sectors will be af-
fected by autonomous vehicles[33–37]. Here, we briefly
summarize these reports to provide further context for
the motivation of our work and to more broadly indi-
cate the potential consequences of a malicious hack on
autonomous vehicles.
1. Transportation as a Service (TaaS): Individ-
ual ownership of vehicles is a standard model for
personal transportation, especially away from ur-
ban centers where public transit systems are gen-
erally unavailable. Autonomous vehicles are an-
ticipated to shift away from the ownership model
where transportation is a “product” and toward
transportation as an on-demand service[33]. Gen-
erally, the idea of TaaS is that individual riders do
not own the vehicle they ride in. Instead, they pay
a fee to be transported between two destinations.
While this change in ownership model is expected
to bring travel costs down, it also means the vehi-
cle can be immediately used by another individual
in need of transportation services. Numerous au-
tomotive manufacturers are already beginning to
move their business models in this direction with
pilot programs targeting the ride-sharing market.
2. Parking: Following from the notion of TaaS, park-
ing requirements for individually owned vehicles
will wane. One estimate concluded that approxi-
mately 60 of the 150 billion ft2 of total parking (in-
cluding parking garages, lots, street parking, etc.)
in the U.S. will be available for redevelopment[34].
However, this shift in land use also means that mu-
nicipal revenues from parking ticket fines will also
be reduced. For large cities, such as Los Angeles
and New York, this loss is estimated around $150
and $550 million.
3. Law Enforcement: Loss of revenue for law en-
forcement services due to the reduction in park-
ing tickets is expected to be accompanied by de-
creased revenues from speeding and other traffic
violations. As a recent example from 2014, Wash-
ington D.C. issued an average of 773 tickets per
day from speeding cameras alone, totaling ≈ $40
million per year[35]. In more extreme cases, a few
small cities and municipalities in the U.S. gener-
ate nearly 50% of the town revenue through traffic
tickets[35]. It remains an open question how these
budgetary losses will be dealt with. Along simi-
lar lines, there is a reasonable expectation that the
focus for police activity will also shit; traffic offi-
cers and emergency responders will see decreased
demand, leading to either job losses or reallocation
of police staff.
4. Insurance: One of the most anticipated benefits of
autonomous vehicles is a decrease in the number of
7automotive accidents. While this shift reduces de-
mand for emergency responders, it will also signifi-
cantly rewrite the automotive insurance industry’s
financial model. Instead of a monthly fee based
on driving history, we can reasonably expect to see
more usage-based policies that charge by the num-
ber of miles traveled per year. Similarly, health in-
surance policies will need to absorb changes in the
number of automotive-related injuries. For exam-
ple, ≈ 37, 000 Americans die in car accidents each
year, with nearly 100-fold more treated in hospital
emergency rooms[33]. This annual expenditure of
≈ $30 billion is likely to see dramatic reductions,
directly affecting both the insurance industry and
how hospitals fund their services.
5. Energy Consumption: A variety of factors that
contribute to the total energy consumption of au-
tomotive vehicles are expected to change[33, 36].
Decreased congestion, eco-friendly driving algo-
rithms that prioritize efficiency over performance,
platooning, improved crash avoidance, and vehicle
right-sizing are all expected to reduce the overall
amount of energy consumed in autonomous vehi-
cles. Higher highway travel speeds, reduced travel
costs, and increased access for poor, elderly, and
disabled users, on the other hand, are expected to
increase the amount of energy consumed. Exactly
how these two sets of competing forces balance re-
main to be seen, but a shift away from fossil fu-
els and towards electrification is broadly acknowl-
edged.
6. Real Estate: Current land usage and valuation
has been established with human-driven vehicles in
mind. However, if electric autonomous vehicles are
intelligently programmed to return to a centralized
charging and maintenance hub, then there will be
a waning need for gas stations, consumer-facing ve-
hicle maintenance shops, and car wash stations. As
these businesses see less demand, the property can
be sold and repurposed for other needs. Similarly,
suburban and exurban communities will see shifts
in property value as commutes become easier and
faster.
7. Package and Food Delivery: The U.S. Census
Bureau has two broad categories in management
and sales for employees not elsewhere classified.
Excluding these non-specific categories, trucking
and delivery drivers employes 3.5 million people,
making it the most common job in 27 of the 50 U.S.
states[37]. As human drivers are replaced, the eco-
nomic savings for delivery companies are expected
to reduce consumer costs. Comparisons with au-
tomation’s effect in manufacturing suggest there
will be a substantial mismatch in skills and geo-
graphic location between these unemployed drivers
and available jobs. As such, there will likely be a
substantially increased demand for job retraining
services.
While further knock-on effects are expected to ripple
out into additional sectors of public and private life, the
examples provided here suggest a malicious hack that
disables autonomously-driven vehicles would have broad
social, economic, and security consequences.
A PRIMER ON MALICIOUS HACKING
A number of high-profile events illustrate the various
ways hacking can be weaponized. A selection of recent
examples include: (i) distributed denial-of-service with
zombie botnets, (ii) large-scale social engineering and
disinformation campaigns using stolen credentials, (iii)
remote deactivation of electricity grids[38], (iv) indus-
trial sabotage[39, 40], (v) theft of money, identity, and
intellectual property, (vi) disrupted access to medical
facilities[41], (vii) disclosure of personal information as
a means of coercion, and (viii) large-scale covert cyber-
spying. Individually, these malicious hacks demonstrate
the harm a few individuals can inflict with the right soft-
ware exploits. Collectively, they form a broader picture
of the social challenges presented by technology. To fur-
ther illustrate, we summarize some of the more common
yet lower-profile forms of hacking prevalent today.
1. Digital eavesdropping can be easily achieved with
packet sniffers such as Wireshark or its equivalents.
These software tools can be used defensively to ana-
lyze and record suspicious network traffic, however,
they can also be used to discretely monitor the ac-
tivity of others without their consent.
2. Keyloggers are a class of software that monitors
user input through the mouse and keyboard. Gen-
erally, the purpose is to discretely record sensitive
information such as passwords.
3. Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed Denial of
Service (DDoS) attacks flood targeted servers in or-
der to overload bandwidth and computational re-
sources, forcing the target into a non-responsive
state. In DDoS attacks, hackers will deploy re-
motely controlled computers (bots) to increase the
number of data packets used in the attack. Inter-
estingly, the damage inflicted by DDoS attacks are
mediated through collective effects of multiple bots
simultaneously flooding the target. This example
shows how collective properties have already been
weaponized by malicious hackers.
4. Brute force hacking is a resource-intensive attack
typically launched against narrowly chosen targets.
It involves the systematic effort to access and de-
crypt data by trying all combinations of passwords.
85. As an alternative to brute force, man-in-the-middle
hacks can use various techniques to insert them-
selves between a user and the network. From this
position, an attacker can force or fool the user to
enter sensitive data, passwords, or information of
value.
6. Once installed, malware, viruses, and trojan soft-
ware are routinely used in a variety of ways. Com-
mon examples include (i) the covert transmission
of information such as data from a keylogger, (ii)
theft of intellectual property, and (iii) the installa-
tion of software that forces a system to discretely
participate in DDoS attacks.
In a relatively short period of time, hacking has gone
from an esoteric pastime requiring in-depth expertise to
an easily accessible outlet for malicious behavior. Today,
there are multiple front-end software packages enabling
anyone with basic shell scripting knowledge to perform
all of the attacks listed above. Indeed, publicly available
software such as Wifiphisher automates the process of
de-authenticating a user from a legitimate internet ac-
cess point, allows the user to connect to an “evil twin”
access point that functions as a man-in-the-middle, and
ultimately presents the target with a seemingly legiti-
mate request that asks them to enter sensitive informa-
tion. We provide this information here specifically to
argue the case that hacking of autonomous vehicles isn’t
just a possibility, but for all practical purposes, it is an
inevitability. As such, preventive strategies like those dis-
cussed in the main text will be essential for the safety of
drivers.
AN OUTLOOK ON HACKING AUTONOMOUS
VEHICLES
Current estimates project approximately 150 million
internet-connected vehicles on the road by 2020, with
most sharing real-time data through cloud services[42].
A comprehensive knowledge of vehicle localization, local
traffic, weather, and infrastructure conditions would re-
duce congestion, lead to more efficient commutes, and po-
tentially less accidents among many other possible ben-
efits. However, this increase in connectedness leads to a
corresponding increase in vulnerability through mapping,
entertainment, and productivity software. As such, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration lists 15
assessment criteria for significant software updates of ve-
hicles and their related subsystems. The first four criteria
are (i) data recording and sharing, (ii) data privacy, (iii)
system safety, and (iv) vehicle cybersecurity[43], all of
which are likely hacking targets.
A recent string of “white hat hacks” have demon-
strated the existence of vulnerabilities in vehicle software
through proof-of-concept demonstrations. Chris Valasek
and Charley Miller gave one of most well-known exam-
ples through a zero-day exploit of the entertainment sys-
tem in a Jeep Cherokee to seize control of the target
vehicle[42]. In response, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles is-
sued a software patch to 1.4 million affected vehicles. In
a significantly less-sophisticated demonstration, a low-
cost (≈ $60), low-power laser pulse generator was used
to stop an autonomous vehicle by creating a “ghost” ob-
ject in its drive path[44, 45].
Despite these concerning demonstrations, resources are
being invested into the development of new software tech-
nology such as vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I) communications[46], which allow the
sharing of data through wireless networks. These proto-
cols will be essential for autonomous vehicles to maxi-
mize fuel efficiency, minimize traffic congestion, and pre-
vent accidents. However, this necessarily means vehicles
will be communicating with one another, creating new
opportunities for malicious hackers to exploit. Indeed,
thought leaders on the subject have expressed due con-
cern. Nevertheless, the U.S. DOT issued a proposed rule
in December 2016 that would advance the deployment
of connected vehicle technologies throughout the U.S. by
mandating the deployment of V2V throughout the light
vehicle fleet.
Given the demonstrated hacks exploiting these new
connected software systems, there is an urgent need for
a better understanding of how collective motion can be
weaponized. As such, the anticipate-and-inoculate ap-
proach discussed in the main text will likely continue
to progress alongside autonomous vehicle technologies,
hopefully in a manner that proactively prevents any
large-scale malicious hacks.
EQUATIONS OF MOTION AND NUMERICS
In the main text we provided a simplified form of the
equations of motion where indices for vehicles were ex-
cluded. We also combined the equations of motion for
human- and autonomously-driven vehicles through the
index α, which takes the value A for autonomously-driven
vehicles and H for human-driven vehicles. Here, we ex-
plicitly write out the full equations of motion with in-
dices and appropriate substitution for the repulsion force
coefficient, as described in the main text. Thus, for a
simulation with NH human-driven vehicles and NA au-
tonomously driven vehicles, we have
x¨i = F
propulsion
i + F
repulsion
i ,
F propulsioni = τ
−1
α (vα,i − x˙i),
F repulsioni =
{ (
vα,i
τα
) [
(1−δxi,i+1/R)3/2
(1−r/R)−3/2
]
, δxi,i+1 < R
0, otherwise,
(S1)
where the index i = 1 . . . N runs over all N = NA +NH
vehicles, the distance δxi,i+1 = xi+1−xi is the separation
between two consecutive cars within a lane, and the pre-
ferred speed vα,i is drawn from a Gaussian distribution
9for the NH human-driven vehicles whereas autonomous
vehicles are all assigned a single uniform value. Simula-
tions were performed on straight “roads” of length L with
periodic boundary conditions. When a vehicle’s position
at time step t was calculated to xi(t) = L + δL > L,
its position was stored as xi(t) = δL. As a result, the
calculation of δxi,i+1 = x(t)i+1 − x(t)i takes into consid-
eration the possibility that for vehicle i, the next vehicle
(i+ 1) could be wrapped around back to the origin, and
appropriate offsets are incorporated to avoid these edge
effects. For human-driven vehicles, the preferred veloc-
ities vα,i were redrawn from the Gaussian distribution
when they were wrapped around to the origin in order
to keep faster vehicles from simply catching-up with the
slowest vehicle and equilibrating into a single long chain
of vehicles. All simulations were performed in Python
with a time step ∆t such that ∆t = (1/20) s, and a total
of 10,000 time steps (500 s) were computed.
QUANTITATIVE IMAGE ANALYSIS
Daytime traffic videos in California (CA) were ob-
tained from live traffic camera streams available on the
Caltrans website[22]. Nighttime traffic video from At-
lanta, Georgia (GA) was recorded manually from a conve-
niently located building near the highway off ramp using
a Canon EOS Rebel DSLR. Videos were analyzed using
the OpenCV computer vision library and features of in-
terest were detected through the Harris corner detection
algorithm[47]. Features were chosen and spatial averag-
ing performed such that individual cars could be auto-
matically localized and tracked within each video using
the Lucas-Kanade[48] algorithm. Distances between lane
markers were used to scale and correct for perspective
distortions of the camera. Specifically, federal highway
guidelines specify the use of 10 ft white markers with 40 ft
spacing (center-to-center distance), though most drivers
grossly underestimate this distance[49].
Empirical measurements [Fig. 2] of the median and
interquartile range for density ρ, velocity v, and flux Φ
are provided here for reference [Table S1].
CALCULATION OF HUMAN DRIVER
RESPONSE TIME
While the DOT data provided vehicle coordinates x(t),
we used quantitative image analysis on the first two
video sources to obtain this information. Differentiat-
ing and smoothing with a Savitzky-Golay filter allowed
us to identify vehicles that stopped and accelerated over
a time tf ≈ 2 − 5 s due to stop-and-go traffic. To em-
pirically determine the human-driver response time τH ,
we assume that a driver in stopped traffic will accelerate
when a sufficiently large gap between them and the next
car becomes available. The timescale during which the
car adjusts its velocity then corresponds to the response
timescale τH .
From this perspective, we define the moment a vehi-
cle at rests starts moving as t = t0. From our image
analysis and DOT data, we found that within a few sec-
onds, most cars initially accelerate, but then experience
a plateau in velocity. At lower densities, this time to
plateau is about 2 s, while for higher densities, it is about
5 s. Defining this zero-to-plateau time interval as tf , we
extract τH by fitting measured vehicle position data to
x˙(t− t0)/x˙(tf − t0) = 1− e−t/τH with a non-linear least
squares method. In the main text, we simplified this
expression by setting t0 = 0 for convenience. In higher-
density traffic, we observed drivers tend to accelerate over
longer periods of time, whereas in lower-density traffic,
drivers tend to react faster. From the empirical Califor-
nia (CA), Georgia (GA), and Department of Transporta-
tion (DOT) measurements of the human driver response
time τH [Fig. 1(c)], we calculated average τH = 2.0 s,
which was used in simulations.
VALIDATIONS OF ACTIVE MATTER MODEL
USING ONE-LANE TRAFFIC FLOW
Having defined the equations of motion for vehicles on
a single lane road, we performed a series of test simula-
tions to confirm the active matter model proposed here
(e.g., Eq. 1) reproduces basic phenomenology of vehi-
cle traffic. For example, simulating and plotting xi(t)
for N = NH = 50 vehicles immediately reveals the
presence of backwards-propagating density waves, oth-
erwise known as “phantom traffic jams,” that travel at
velocity ∆x/∆t ≈ −2 m/s [Fig. S1(a), dense horizon-
tal bands]. Measurements of the time-dependent density
ρ(t) [Fig. S1(b)] and flux Φ(t) [Fig. S1(c)] provide further
useful quantification of collective motion, as they are in-
fluenced by the balance between steady uniform flow and
the emergence of phantom traffic jams.
For comparison, we analyzed videos of single-lane traf-
fic flow to generate the equivalent empirical observa-
tions. We observed similar density waves with propaga-
tion speeds ≈ −3 to −6 m/s, with qualitatively similar
fluctuations in ρ(t) and Φ(t) [Fig. S2]. In the main text,
we provide a more rigorous quantitative comparison be-
tween this empirical and simulation data [Fig. 2].
MOBIL LANE CHANGING
To capture realistic highway traffic, we need a mi-
croscopic description to determine when vehicles should
switch lanes in our active matter simulation. While a
variety of options have been established in the litera-
ture, here, we utilize the Minimizing Overall Breaking
Induced By Lane changes (MOBIL) model[26, 27]. This
framework considers whether a vehicle and its neighbors
would better match their preferred speed if the given ve-
hicle changes lanes. Defining the changes in acceleration
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TABLE S1. Empirical values for density, velocity, and flux. The sources are: (1) Northbound 101 at Cabrillo Blvd., California,
(2) Northbound 101 at 1st St., California, (3) Southbound I85 exit 249C, GA, and (4) Southbound 101, Hollywood Freeway,
California (DOT NGSIM dataset). Rows where the source is starred (∗) are used to generate the response time τH in Fig. 1.
All entries are used in empirical measurements of Φ(ρ) in Fig. 2.
ρ v Φ
(cars/km/lane) (km/h) (cars/h/lane)
source 1st quartile median 3rd quartile 1st quartile median 3rd quartile 1st quartile median 3rd quartile
1 10 13 16 71 76 83 719 1,004 1,285
1 13 16 21 72 79 85 924 1,292 1,586
1 29 32 37 35 37 39 1,019 1,209 1,364
1 30 32 35 36 38 40 1,065 1,214 1,332
2∗ 85 95 117 5 6 9 509 660 873
2 3 5 9 93 107 122 270 507 788
3∗ 104 127 149 3 6 8 432 693 899
4∗ 36 37 40 39 44 47 1,542 1,623 1,688
FIG. S1. Basic time-dependent quantification of simulated
human-driven vehicles. (a) Space-time diagram of vehicle tra-
jectories. Here, each randomly colored line (various shades of
green) is a vehicle with average velocity ∆x/∆t > 0. When
the local slope is flat, the vehicle has stopped due to the emer-
gence of backwards-propagating density waves (∆x/∆t < 0,
shaded orange). Measurements of the (b) density and (c) flux
show random statistical fluctuations that depend on the num-
ber of vehicles NH in the simulation. Note, the total length
of the simulated road L = 1.0 km, so that the average density
≈ NH/L.
between the next time step t + 1 and the current time
step t due to a lane switch as
∆x¨i = x¨i(t+ 1)− x¨i(t),
∆x¨i−1 = x¨i−1(t+ 1)− x¨i−1(t), and
∆x¨j−1 = x¨j−1(t+ 1)− x¨j−1(t), (S2)
we can express the MOBIL condition as
∆x¨i + p(∆x¨i−1 + ∆x¨j−1) > 0, (S3)
where the subscript i corresponds to the vehicle changing
lanes, i−1 is the current vehicle behind the lane-changing
vehicle at time t, and j − 1 is the vehicle that will be
behind the lane changing vehicle at t + 1 if i changes
lanes. The constant p is referred to as the politeness fac-
tor. A value p = 1 reflects the most considerate driver,
where their decision to change lanes decreases the over-
all amount of braking among all three vehicles. A value
p = 0 reflects the most selfish driver, where a decision
to change lanes allows for their own acceleration at the
expense of other trailing vehicles. A value p > 1 cor-
responds to the altruistic driver, where their decision to
change lanes benefits trailing vehicles at the driver’s ex-
pense. And finally, a value p < 0 reflects a malicious
driver, which deliberately forces trailing vehicles to use
their brakes.
In our active matter model, we have self-propulsion
and repulsive collision-avoidance forces, but only the re-
pulsive force depend on the distance between vehicles.
Thus, maximizing acceleration with MOBIL lane chang-
ing corresponds to minimizing the overall amount of re-
pulsion in the system. In all simulations, we choose p = 1,
which corresponds to force minimization of a vehicle and
its nearest neighbors. Every time step, a vehicle has
a 50% chance to choose a neighboring lane to change
into. This is done to avoid artificial states, where all ve-
hicles simultaneously switch into the same lane, leaving
large empty gaps. The left-most (` = 1) and right-most
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(a) (b) (c)
FIG. S2. Basic time-dependent quantification of empirical human-driven vehicles. The three data sources in (a-c) correspond
to the same three data sources described in the main text Fig. 1. The three rows of plots shown here mimic Fig. S1, and show
qualitative similarities.
(` = 3) lanes, can change into the center (` = 2) lane,
whereas the center lane can choose between the other
two lanes with equal probability. Within fluctuations,
we find that different p values do not affect macroscopic
flux-densities measurements. Likewise, in the presence
of disabled vehicles, p does not change the underlying
percolation-geometric transition discussed in the main
text.
NAGEL-SCHREKENBERG CELLULAR
AUTOMATA MODELS
To confirm the model-independence of our results, we
additionally perform Nagel-Schrekenberg[15] cellular au-
tomata simulations. These correspond to simulations of
vehicles on a lattice of fixed cell length ds, where vehicles
are updated according to certain rules that mimic real-
istic driving. The basic rules are (i) vehicles accelerate
to a maximum velocity, (ii) unless there is a vehicle in
front of them, (iii) in which case the vehicle slows down
accordingly, and finally, (iv) vehicles are slowed down
at random, to incorporate driving variances. Here, we
performed simulations corresponding to two different cell
lengths, 4.5 and 7.0 m respectively. The maximum veloc-
ity of vehicles are in units of ds m/s, where ds is the cell
length. For a 1,000 m road, these distances correspond to
≈ 143 and 222 sites. Additionally, we set the maximum
velocity v0 to 7 units per time step, which translates to
29 m/s (65 mi/h).
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FIG. S3. Flux-density curve for Nagel-Schrekenberg cellular
automata simulation with cell length equal to 4.5 m. Black
line denotes average value of flux while blue shaded band in-
dicates fluctuations about this mean.
At every time step, a random number p ∈ [0, 1] is com-
puted, and if p > 0.5, the following rules apply. The up-
date rule for vehicle α is vα(t+ 1) = min(vα + 1, v0, sα),
where sα is the distance from car α to the car in front.
This update rule ensures that at every step the veloc-
ity is increased by 1, until the maximum velocity v0 is
reached, unless obstructed by a leading vehicle, in which
case speed is reduced accordingly. If p < 0.5, the ve-
hicle decreases its velocity by 1, without going through
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the above update rule - this is the critical component
that gives rise to driving variances and traffic jams in
this model. The flux-density curve for 4.5 m cell length
simulations is shown in Fig. S3. While the flux-density
curve has clear differences with continuous laned active
matter simulations [Fig.2b], percolation probabilities fall
right on the appropriate discrete geometrical predictions
[Fig.4(a)]. This validates our claim that percolation re-
sults are model independent.
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